Abstract This paper develops a dynamic model of discrete choice that incorporates peer effects into consideration sets. We characterize equilibrium behavior and study the empirical content of the dynamic model we offer. In our set-up, the choices of friends act as exclusion restrictions in the stochastic variation of the subset of alternatives that each person considers at the moment of picking an option. They allow us to recover (from a sequence of observed choices) the ranking of preferences of each person, the attention mechanism, and the set of connections or nodes between the people in the network. The identification strategy we offer does not rely on the variation of the set of available options (or menus) which remain the same across all the observations. JEL codes: D83, O33
Introduction
Much research has shown that peer effects have a predominant role in explaining people's choices. In the context of discrete choice models, the basic idea is that a person is more likely to select a specific option if more of her friends are doing so. These models typically assume that the person is aware of all the available options and the choices of friends affect her ranking of preferences. The more recent literature on (single-agent) consideration set models relaxes this full awareness postulate by allowing for the possibility that people consider only a subset of the available options when making a decision. We develop a dynamic model of discrete choice that incorporates peer effects in the formation of consideration sets. In doing so, we offer an alternative mechanism for peer effects. By studying its empirical content we show our model is quite tractable from an econometrics perspective.
In our set-up, people are connected through a social network. Each person in the network has a strict preference order over a finite set of options or alternatives. At random times, governed by independent Poisson "alarm clocks", a given person has the opportunity to pick up an option. (The person sticks to this option till the revision opportunity arises again.) We assume the person is boundedly rational and does not consider all the available options at the moment of revising her selection. Instead, she observes the choices of her friends and forms a consideration set. Then the person selects the most preferred option among the ones she is actually considering. This model leads to a sequence of choices that evolve through time according to a continuous time Markov process.
We initially show the dynamic system has a unique equilibrium (or invariant distribution). We do so under the assumption that each person considers each option with non zero probability. This restriction assures that we can move from any initial configuration of choices to any other one in finite time. That is, the dynamic system is irreducible. We then imagine we can observe a long sequence of choices across people in the network. We provide alternative conditions under which datasets of this sort allow us to recover all the primitives of the model. That is, the strict preference relation of each person, the attention mechanism, and (surprisingly) the set of connections between the people in the network! We build the identification results in a sequence of related steps. First, we assume the researcher can recover the conditional choice probabilities of all people in the network. Each of these probabilities informs us about the frequency of choices of a given person conditional on the alternatives selected by others. In our model, the probability of paying attention to a specific option increases in the number of friends who are currently adopting it. Thus, the choices of friends act as exclusion restrictions in the stochastic variation of the consideration sets. This variation allows us to recover the set of connections between the people in the network and their ranking of preferences. We can then use this information to recover the attention mechanism of each person, i.e., the probability of including a specific option in the consideration set as a function of the number of friends who are adopting it. Interestingly, the identification strategy we pursue does not rely (as most of the theoretical work on consideration sets) on variation of the set of available options (or menus).
Second, we study identification of the conditional choice probabilities. We consider three datasets that differ regarding its informational content: continuous-time data; discrete-time data with arbitrary time intervals; and the distribution of equilibrium choices. The first two datasets allow us to recover the transition rate matrix of the dynamic system (also known as the infinitesimal generator matrix in the statistical literature), and from there we can identify the conditional choice probabilities. In the case of continuous-time data the transition rate matrix is identified without any extra restrictions. To identify the transition rate matrix using discrete-time data with arbitrary time intervals, we invoke insights from Blevins (2017 Blevins ( , 2018 . This latter result exploits the fact that the transition rate matrix in our model is rather parsimonious. To see why, note that the selection revision process governed by the independent Poisson "alarm clocks" implies that the probability that two or more people revise their selected options at the same time is zero. This property translates into a transition rate matrix that has zeros in many known locations.
In the last dataset, we study the possibility of recovering the conditional choice probabilities from equilibrium behavior. (This dataset is clearly less informative than the two previous ones.) To this end, we first show that, under symmetry restrictions, the equilibrium behavior of our model coincides with the so-called Gibbs equilibrium. In this context, identification follows immediately. In particular, the conditional choice probabilities of each person coincide with the corresponding conditional probabilities obtained from equilibrium behavior. We offer some insights to extend this idea to the heterogeneous case.
From a modelling perspective, our set-up combines the dynamic model of social interactions of Blume (1993 Blume ( , 1995 with the (single-agent) model of random consideration sets of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) . By adding peer effects into the consideration sets we are able to use the choices of others as instruments to recover preferences. As we mentioned above, the literature on identification of single-agent consideration set models have mainly relied on variation of the set of available options or menus. The latter includes Aguiar (2017), Aguiar et al. (2016) , Brady and Rehbeck (2016) , Caplin et al. (2018) , Cattaneo et al. (2017) , Horan (2018) , Lleras et al. (2017) , Manzini and Mariotti (2014) , and Masatlioglu et al. (2012) .
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(See Aguiar et al. (2019) for a comparison of several consideration set models in an experimental setting.) Other papers have relied on the existence of exogenous covariates that shift preferences or consideration sets. The latter include Abaluck and Adams (2017) , Barseghyan et al. (2019) , Conlon and Mortimer (2013) , Draganska and Klapper (2011) , Gaynor et al. (2016) , Goeree (2008) , Mehta et al. (2003) , and Roberts and Lattin (1991) .
As we also mentioned, we can recover from the data the set of connections or nodes between the people in the network. In the context of linear models, a few recent papers have made progress in the same direction. Among them, Blume et al. (2015) , Bonaldi et al. (2015 ), De Paula et al. (2018 ), and Manresa (2013 . In the context of discrete-choice, Chambers et al. (2019) also identify the network structure but in their model peer effects do not affect consideration sets but preferences (among many other differences).
The connection between the equilibrium behavior in our model and the Gibbs equilibrium is similar to the one in Blume and Durlauf (2003) .
Let us finally mention two other papers that incorporate peer effects in the formation of consideration sets: Borah and Kops (2018) do so in a static framework and relies on variation of menus for identification. Lazzati (2018) considers a dynamic model but the time is discrete and she focuses on two binary options that can be acquired together.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes equilibrium behavior. Section 3 studies the empirical content of the model. Section 4 presents some simulation results for a model of choosing a restaurant and Section 5 concludes.
The Model

Social Network, Consideration Sets, and Choices
There is a finite set of people connected through a social network. The network is described by a simple graph Γ = (A, e), where A = {1, 2, ..., A} is the set of nodes (or people) and e is the set of edges. Each edge identifies two connected people. For each person a ∈ A, her set of friends (or reference group) is defined as follows
There is a set of alternatives Y = Y ∪ {o} from which each person might choose, where Y = {1, 2, ..., Y } is a finite set of options and o is a default option. Each person a has a strict preference order ≻ a over the set of options Y. All people agree in that the default option is the least preferred. We refer to y = (y a ) a∈A ∈ Y A as a choice configuration.
We model the strategy revision process of alternatives as a continuous time Markov process on the space of choice configurations that describes the evolution of people choices through time. In particular, we assume that people are endowed with independent Poisson "alarm clocks" with rates λ = (λ a ) a∈A . At randomly chosen moments (exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ a ) the alarm of person a goes off.
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When this happens, the person selects the most preferred alternative among the ones she is actually considering. If her consideration set does not include any alternative in Y, then the person selects the default option.
In our model, whether person a pays attention to a particular alternative depends on the configuration of choices of her friends at the moment of revising her selection. Let N v a (y) be the number of friends of person a who select option v in choice configuration y. Formally,
2 That is, each person a is endowed with a collection of random variables {τ a n } ∞ n=1 such that each difference τ a n − τ a n−1 is exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ a . All these differences are independent across people and time.
where 1(·) is the standard indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the underlying event is true and 0 otherwise. The probability that person a pays attention to alternative v ∈ Y given a choice configuration y is Q a (v|N v a (y)). That is, whether the person pays attention to a specific alternative depends on how popular that alternative is among her group of reference. By combining preferences and stochastic consideration sets, the probability that person a selects (at the moment of choosing) alternative v ∈ Y is given by
The probability of selecting the outside option o is just
That is, the default option is selected only when the consideration set is empty.
Let us add two comments about our model. First, it represents a truly boundedly rational model in the sense that people do not solve a dynamic optimization problem and their choice sets may thereby not include their most preferred alternatives for substantially long periods of time. Second, the only source of randomness in choice is via consideration sets. In this sense, our model captures a single, though important, channel of possible mistakes in choices. The social network shapes the nature and the strength of these mistakes.
Remark The attention mechanism we use assumes that the probability of paying attention to a given option depends on the choices of peers at the moment of revising the selection. It is independent of the current option of the person. The model can be easily modified to include the possibility that the current option indeed affects the option that the person picks at the moment of revising her selection. All our results will go through with mild modifications except for the connection of our model with the Gibbs random field models.
Equilibrium
The independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Poisson "alarm clocks", which lead the selection revision process, guarantee that at each time interval at most one person revises her selection almost surely. Thus, the transition rates between choice configurations that differ in more than one component are zero. Formally, the transition rate from choice configuration y to any different one y ′ is as follows
In the statistical literature on continuous time Markov processes these transition rates are the out of diagonal terms of the transition rate matrix (also known as the infinitesimal generator matrix). The rate of transition out from a given choice configuration y is simply
We will indicate by M the transition rate matrix. In our model, the number of choice configurations is (Y + 1)
There are many different ways of ordering the choice configurations and thereby writing the transition rate matrix. To avoid any sort of ambiguity in the exposition, we will let the choice configurations be ordered according to the lexicographic order with o treated as zero. Constructed in this way the first element of M is (for
A be the position of y according to the lexicographic order. Then,
An equilibrium in our model is an invariant distribution µ : To guarantee existence of such an equilibrium we impose a simple restriction. This extra assumption will also play a key role in the identification of the model.
Assumption A1 simply states that, for any choice configuration, the probability that each person considers any given option at the moment of revising her selection is strictly positive. It implies that each subset of options is considered with non zero probability.
Below, we let
states equilibrium existence and characterizes equilibrium behavior. 
Proof For an irreducible, finite-state continuous Markov chain the steady-state µ exists and it is unique. Thus, we only need to prove that A1 implies that the Markov chain induced by our model is irreducible. First notice that, under A1, for each a ∈ A, y a ∈ Y, and y ∈ Y A , we have that
To show irreducibility, let y and y ′ be two different choice configurations. It follows from expression (2) that we can go from one configuration to the other one with positive probability in less than A steps.
The characterization of µ follows as the invariant distribution satisfies the balance condition
The next steps show this claim.
In moving from the fifth line to the sixth one we used the fact that, in our model, P a (y a |y
The next example describes the equilibrium behavior of a simple specification of our model.
Example 1:
There are two identical, connected people that select among two alternatives, namely, option 1 and the default option o. The rates for their Poisson "alarm clocks" are 1. Thus, for a = 1, 2, we get that
Note that we avoided the sub-index in Q because of the symmetry. The transition rate matrix M is as follows. (The columns are ordered as the rows.)
By Proposition 2.1, after simple calculations, the steady-state equilibrium is given by
Empirical Content of the Model
This section states a set of alternative conditions under which the model is identified. The requirements we propose vary with the strength of the datasets we consider. As it is always the case with identification, we will abstract from small sample issues. The aim of our analysis is to provide conditions under which the researcher can uniquely recover (from the data) the set of connections Γ = (A, e), the profile of strict preferences (≻ a ) a∈A , the attention mechanism (Q a ) a∈A , and (when possible) the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" (λ a ) a∈A . We will separate the identification analysis in two parts. First, we will assume the researcher knows the conditional choice probabilities (P a ) a∈A and will provide conditions under which the main parts of the model can be uniquely recovered from this information. We will then elaborate on the identification of the conditional choice probabilities (P a ) a∈A .
Identification of the Model Knowing (P a ) a∈A
Let us initially assume the researcher knows the conditional choice probabilities (P a ) a∈A . The identification strategy we pursue relies on two extra assumptions. Assumption A2 requires each person to have at least one friend. Assumption A3 states that each person pays more attention to a particular option if more of her friends are adopting it. Under assumptions A1-A3, the choices of peers act as exclusion restrictions in the stochastic variation of the consideration sets. This variation allows us to recover the connections (or edges) between the people in the network and the ranking of preferences of each of them. We can then sequentially identify the attention mechanism of each person moving from the most preferred alternative to the least preferred one. Proposition 3.1 formalizes these claims. Proposition 3.1. Suppose A1-A3 are satisfied and we know (P a ) a∈A . Then, the set of connections Γ = (A, e), the profile of strict preferences (≻ a ) a∈A , and the attention mechanism (Q a ) a∈A are identified.
Proof By A1, P a has full support for all y. By A2 and A3, P a (v|y) is strictly decreasing in N 
Identification of (P a ) a∈A
This section studies identification of the conditional choice probabilities and (when possible) the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" from three different datasets.
In the first two datasets the researcher observes people's choices at time intervals of length ∆ and can consistently estimate Pr y t+∆ = y ′ |y t = y for each pair y ′ , y ∈ Y A . We will capture these transition probabilities by a matrix P(∆). (Here again, we will assume that the choice configurations are ordered according to the lexicographic order when we construct P(∆).) The connection between P(∆) and M is as follows
The first two datasets only differ regarding ∆. Specifically, in the first dataset we let the time interval be very small. We can think of this dataset as the "ideal dataset" that registers people's choices in continuous time. With the proliferation of on-line platforms and scanner this sort of data might indeed be available for some applications! In the second dataset we allow the time interval to be of arbitrary size. Finally, in the third dataset we assume the researcher can only recover the distribution of equilibrium choices. It is rather simple to see that the informational content decreases as we move from the first to the last dataset. The next table formally describes the three datasets we consider.
Dataset 1 The researcher knows lim ∆→0 P(∆) Dataset 2 The researcher knows P(∆) Dataset 3 The researcher knows µ
The first result of this section is as follows.
Proposition 3.2 (Dataset 1).
The conditional choice probabilities (P a ) a∈A and the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" (λ a ) a∈A are identified.
Proof Since lim ∆→0 P(∆) = M, we can recover transition rate matrix from the data. Recall that
and a ∈ A. Notice that, for each y ∈ Y A , v∈Y λ a P a (v|y) = λ a v∈Y P a (v|y) = λ a .
Then we can also recover λ a for each a ∈ A.
Remark. The proof of Proposition 3.2 relies on the fact that when the time interval between the observations goes to zero, then we can recover M. There are at least two well-known cases that produce the same outcome without requiring ∆ → 0. The first one happens when the length interval ∆ is below a threshold ∆. The second one occurs when the researcher can observe the dynamic system at two different length intervals ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 that are not multiple of each other.
(See, e.g., Blevins (2017) and the literature therein.)
The next proposition states that, by adding an extra restriction, the transition rate matrix can be identified from people's choices even if these choices are observed at the endpoints of long time intervals. In this case, the researcher needs to know the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks", or normalize them in empirical work.
Proposition 3.3 (Dataset 2). If A2 is satisfied, we know (λ a ) a∈A and M has distinct eigenvalues that do not differ by an integer multiple of 2πi/∆, then the conditional choice probabilities (P a ) a∈A are generically identified.
Proof This proof builds on Theorem 1 of Blevins (2017) and Theorem 3 of Blevins (2018) . For the present case, it follows from the last two theorems, that the transition rate matrix M is generically identified if, in addition to the conditions in Proposition 3.3, we have that
This condition is always satisfied if A > 1. Identification of M follows because, by A2, A ≥ 2. We can then uniquely recover (P a ) a∈A from M. See the proof of Proposition 3.2
The key element in proving Proposition 3.3 is that the transition rate matrix of our model is rather parsimonious. To see why, recall that, at any given time, only one person revises her selection with non zero probability. This feature of the model translates into a transition rate matrix M that has many zeros in known locations.
We finally relate our results with the Gibbs random field models. These models have been used to study social interactions by Allen (1982) , Blume (1993 Blume ( , 1995 , and Blume and Durlauf (2003) , among many others. We will use the connection between the two models to discuss the identification of (P a ) a∈A from equilibrium behavior µ. To this end we will assume the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" are identical for all people. In this case, by Proposition 2.1, the equilibrium behavior µ relates linearly to the conditional choice probabilities (P a ) a∈A
The main difficulty for identification (if we only observe µ) is that the number of moments in the data is usually smaller than the number of expressions we want to recover. This can be easily seen if we eliminate the symmetry condition in Example 1. In this case, we would be interested in recovering four conditional choice probabilities P 1 (1|0), P 1 (1|1), P 2 (1|0), and P 2 (1|1).
(The conditional probabilities of choosing the default option can be obtained directly from the latter.) In this illustration, the dataset would contain four equilibrium moments, namely, µ(o, o),
, and µ(1, 1). The issue is that (at most) only three of them can be linearly independent. So, in this case, the choice probabilities we are interested in would be just partially identified. It is also clear from the example that this issue is solved if we add symmetry across people. If we do so, we would have only two elements to recover, and the model would be overidentified. Moreover, the conditional choice probabilities would relate to the equilibrium conditions in a simple way
That is, the conditional choice distributions of each person coincide with the corresponding conditional distributions obtained from equilibrium behavior. This result can be extended to the case of more options and/or more people by using the notion of compatibility of conditional distributions, that we include next for completeness.
Definition:
We say (P a ) a∈A is a set of compatible conditional distributions if there exists a joint distribution P :
The last identification result follows from connecting the equilibrium behavior in our model with the Gibbs equilibrium. A similar connection is discussed in Blume and Durlauf (2003) .
Proposition 3.4 (Dataset 3)
. If (P a ) a∈A is a set of compatible conditional distributions and the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" are identical for all people, then the conditional choice probabilities (P a ) a∈A are identified. Moreover,
Proof From Proposition 2.1, µ satisfies
We only need to show that if (P a ) a∈A is a set of compatible conditional distributions, then µ = P solves (3). If we let µ = P, then right hand side of (3) is
In addition, the left hand side of (3) is µ(y) = P(y).
Thus µ(y) = P(y) solves (3) for each y ∈ Y A .
The technical conditions required for a set of conditional distributions to be compatible are discussed in Kaiser and Cressie (2000) . It is clear from their analysis that compatibility demands strong symmetric restrictions. In particular, in the two people, two actions case, Arnold and Press (1989) show that compatibility holds if and only if the next equality is satisfied
It follows that, though the identification strategy in Proposition 3.4 is interesting because it only requires data on equilibrium behavior, its drawback is that the symmetry restrictions we need to assume might not be quite appealing in practice. We next explain that (in our setting) these restrictions could be relaxed if the network is large enough.
To elaborate on the last claim, let us assume there is an edge between each pair of people in the network, so that all people are connected. The number of people in the network is A. For each of them, there are Y available options (in addition to the default one). Thus, the number of equilibrium points minus one (since all of them add up one) is
It is clear that this number imposes an upper bound on the number of conditional choice probabilities we can recover from the data. Recall that, for each alternative v ∈ Y,
Thus, in our model, the conditional choice probabilities of person a depend on the choices of others only via the number of people that select each option. This invariant restriction reduces the number of expressions we need to recover to
It follows that the number of moments in the data is larger than the number of expressions we want to recover if and only if
When Y = 1 and A = 2, as in Example 1, then this inequality is not fulfilled. (Indeed, we explained earlier that the conditional choice probabilities are not identified from equilibrium behavior in this case.) However, in the case of one alternative (in addition to the default option) the inequality holds if there are at least five people in the network (that is, A ≥ 5). Moreover, the number of people for which the inequality holds reduces to 4 whenever Y ≥ 2. That is, a moderately large number of connections in the network seems to help the identification of the conditional choice probabilities. Of course, this analysis is still not complete as some of the moments in the data could still be linearly dependent.
Illustration: Choosing a Restaurant
This section simulates a sequence of choices for a simple version of our model that we apply to restaurant decisions. The exercise has two aims. First, we illustrate how people's mistakes relate to the structure of the network. Second, we show how the main parts of the model can indeed be estimated from the sequence of choices that we simulate.
Simulation
There are five people in the network. Their reference groups are as follows
Note that each person has at least one friend, so A2 is satisfied. There are two possible restaurants at which they can have dinner. Restaurant 1 offers Mediterranean food and Restaurant 2 is a Steakhouse. Thus, Y = {1, 2}. The default option o involves eating at home. The preferences of these people are as follows 2 ≻ 1 1, 1 ≻ 2 2, 2 ≻ 3 1, 1 ≻ 4 2, and 1 ≻ 5 2.
That is, Persons 2, 4, and 5 prefer Mediterranean food, and Persons 1 and 3 prefer the Steakhouse. We will assume the attention mechanism is invariant across people and alternatives. In this case, we can avoid some sub-indices and let Q(v|N Note that Persons 2 and 4 are identical in all respect except in the type of friend they have. In particular, Person 4 shares with her friend the same preference relation over the two restaurants; the opposite is true for Person 2. This difference leads Person 4 to make fewer mistakes. It becomes clear from this illustration that homophyly is good news in our model! In addition, notice that Person 3, having more friends, makes also fewer mistakes.
To illustrate a bit more how the network structure shapes people's mistakes, let us add two more connections in the model. In particular, let us assume that Person 3 is part of the consideration sets of Persons 1 and 2. That is,
Repeating the previous exercise, the new network generates the following marginal distributions. Notice that the probabilities of making mistakes decrease for Persons 1, 2, and 3. But the change is larger for Persons 1 and 3 as they share the same preferences over the restaurants.
Estimation
This section uses the sequence of choices we simulated in the previous section to show that the main parts of the model can indeed be estimated. (In this case, identification follows by Proposition 3.3.) To this end, we will use the second specification of the network structure. Also, to make the analysis more tractable, we will impose three extra conditions: First, we will assume each person has at most two friends. Second, we will assume the attention mechanism is invariant across people and alternatives. Third, we will let the network be undirected. Under these assumptions the number of possible sets of connections among people or networks is 112.
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In addition, recall that there are 5 people in the population and two restaurants. Thus, the number of profiles of strict preferences ≻ = (≻ a ) a∈A is 2 5 = 32. Finally, the attention mechanism has 3 parameters to estimate Q = (Q(v|0), Q(v|1), Q(v|2))
′ .
In line with A3, we will consider attention mechanisms that respect the monotonicity condition. That is, Q(v|0) < Q(v|1) < Q(v|2).
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In addition, given A1, we let Q(v|N v a (y)) ∈ (0, 1) for N v a (y) = 0, 1, 2. Let us indicate by θ = (Γ, ≻, Q) an element in the space of possible parameters we want to estimate. Each of them induces a transition rate matrix M(θ).
We normalize the intensity parameter λ a to 1 for all a ∈ A. Thus, for each θ, we can construct the transition rate matrix M(θ) using equations (1) and (2). In turn, this information allows to calculate the so called transition matrix P(θ, ∆) = e ∆M(θ) .
We can use the latter to build the log-likelihood function is the (k, m)-th element of the matrix P(θ, ∆). Finally, let us define the estimated parameters as follows
For a sequence of T = 15, 000 observations the Maximum Likelihood estimates are as follows Network N 1 = {2} , N 2 = {1} , N 3 = {1, 2} , N 4 = {5} , and N 5 = {4} Preferences 2 ≻ 1 1, 1 ≻ 2 2, 2 ≻ 3 1, 1 ≻ 4 2, and 1 ≻ 5 2 Attention Mechanism Q (v|0) = 0.26, Q (v|1) = 0.75, and Q (v|2) = 0.87 . In summary, the estimates correctly recover the set of connections and the strict preference order of each person in the network and closely approximates the attention mechanism.
3 Without any restriction there are 2 25 = 33, 554, 432 possible network configurations.
Final Remarks
This paper offers a new model of interdependent choices that combines the dynamic model of social interactions of Blume (1993 Blume ( , 1995 with the (single-agent) model of random consideration sets of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) . From a theoretical perspective, we state equilibrium existence and characterize equilibrium behavior. We also illustrate how the network structure shapes people's mistakes. From an applied perspective, in our model, the choices of peers act as exclusion restrictions in the stochastic variation of the considerations sets. This feature allows us to recover (from data) the main parts of the model without relying on variation of the set of alternative options or menus. Interestingly, we show that in addition of nonparametrically recovering the ranking of preferences of each person and the attention mechanism, we also identify the set of connections or nodes between the people in the network.
